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FUTURE INTERESTS IN PROPERTY IN MINNESOTA
II'
A. IN REAL PROPERTY, AT LAW.
THE statutes of Minnesota have had little effect on the future
possibilities, interests, or estates in real property which are pe-
culiar to the grantor. Possibilities of reverter, rights of re-entry
for condition broken, and reversions have generally the charac-
teristics, incidents, and restrictions of the American common law,
or. indeed, of the English common law.2 Future possibilities,
interests, and estates to others have, on the other hand, been
greatly changed by the statutes. 3 For the common law remain-
ders, future uses and devises the statutes have substituted a
"future estate" which is scarcely recognizable as a descendant
of common law ancestors. There is still, however, a relationship
between the old and the new. The change has not been great
enough to dispense with a knowledge of these interests as they
were at the common law.4 A real knowledge of the statutory
future estate requires a knowledge of future interests as they
have been. The very terms of the statutes can only be under-
stood in the light of the conditions which they were intended to
change; and where the statutes are silent the common law con-
tinues to speak. The aim of this article is to outline these inter-
1 This article, while complete in itself, is a continuation of an earlier
article in 3 MINNESOTA I AW REVIEW 320.
23 MINNESOTA LAW REvIEw 327-341.
3For the source of the statutory provisions see 3 MINNESOTA LAW
REvnFW 320 et seq.
4 Fowler, Real Property Law of the State of New York 3.
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ests as they were at the American common law, that is, under the
English common law and the amendatory English statutes,5 and
to show the effect upon them of the Minnesota statutes.
Future Interests under the English Common Law before 1536.
Remainders.-By the English common law, the only future in-
terest in real property that could be limited to a stranger was
a remainder.6 Not every limitation was a remainder. To be a
remainder it must have certain qualities, and unless it had these
qualities, it was void. The necessity of these qualities arose from
the mode of conveyance and the rules of seisin.
Prior to 1536, the normal mode for limiting legal freehold
interests, present or future, was livery of seisin. For A to convey
a fee simple estate to B he must take B upon, or near to, the
land, and there make a symbolic delivery of the seisin to him.
The act was accompanied by a deed of feoffment but the livery
was the significant and effective part of the ceremony, without
which no title passed. 7
Seisin was the possession of a freehold interest in land by
oneself or his tenant. The rules of feudal tenure required that
there be always someone seised of the land to meet adverse
claims to it, and to render the services due to the lord of whom
the land was held. For these reasons the seisin must never be
in abeyance.
The seisin transferred by the livery might be appropriated
to a number of successiqe estates. But the seisin for all must
be delivered at one time. Furthermore the nature of the act
required that it be delivered presently.8 A freehold estate could
not be created to begin in futuro, as to C, to take possession after
the death of A. The livery was made to the first tenant for him-
self and for those to follow him in the possession, as to B for
life, and after his death to C and his heirs. There had conse-
quently to be a present or particular estate created at the same
time with the future estate, and this is the first rule governing
the creation of remainders.
The livery to B would not support a broken series of estates.
It must be possible for each successive estate to become an
estate in possession the moment the prior estate ended. If an
5 Dutcher v. Culver, (1877) 24 Minn. 584, 617.
6 Leake. Property in Land 33; Tiffany. Real Property 278.
7 Co. Lit. 48a; Leake, Property in Land 35; Challis, Real Property
48, 107, 397; Tiffany, Real Property, 848.
8 Challis, Real Property 105.
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interval elapsed the seisin transferred by the livery would be
in abeyance. The seisin during the interval would be in the
grantor and the future limitation would have to take effect out
of his seisin and would be open to the objection that, looking
from the date of the livery, the estate was to begin in futuro.
So on a conveyance to B for life, and one day after his death to C
and his heirs, the limitation to C was void. For a future limita-
tion to be a remainder it must be capable of taking effect in
possession immediately the prior estates end.
There was no restriction on the number of remainders that
could be created out of the fee. There might be any number
of life estates, or estates tail, with or without an ultimate remain-
der in fee. The tenants took in strict succession to each other,
and the seisin of all together made up the seisin of the fee trans-
ferred by the livery. But a limitation that was to take effect
in derogation of a prior estate was not a remainder. The seisin
given to one could not be limited to shift to another upon some
event. The second limitation was thought repugnant to the
first, and partook of the nature of a limitation to begin in futuro.
In a conveyance to B for life, or in fee, but unless within .a year
B pays C £ 100, to C, the limitation to C was void. The familiar
rules that a condition could not be made in favor of a third
party, that a fee could not be mounted upon a fee, and that no
remainder could be limited after a fee simple, were particular
applications of this general rule. A remainder must be limited
to take effect upon the termination of the precedent estate, and
not in abridgment of it.
That a limitation might be a remainder, then, it had to be
limited by the same act of conveyance that created a present
estate, to begin immediately on the termination of the prior estate
and not in derogation of it. These qualities, arising from the
combined operation of the mode of conveyance and the rule of
seisin, still characterize remainders under the American common
law and distinguish them from the other future interests which
became possible after 1536.
Future Interests introduced by the Statutes of Uses (1536)-
Springing and Shifting Uses.--Down to 1536 the system of limi-
tations at law was restricted and simple. There could be no other
interests limited to strangers but present estates and remainders.
9 Challis. Real Pronerty 81 et seq.; Leake, Property in Land 28, Tiff-
any, Real Property 274 et seq.
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But for a century 0 there had been developing another system
of limitations in equity superimposed upon the system at law.
This was the system of uses, the prototype of the modern trust.
The legal title was in one, known as the feoffee to uses, and the
use, the equitable title, was in another, the cestui que use.
There were several reasons for the origin of uses. Statutes
of mortmain had restricted the holding of lands by the church.
The statutes were evaded by giving the lands to a feoffee to
the use of the church. Legal estates were forfeited for treason,
but the use was not forfeitable. The legal title was not devisable,
but the use was. They could be created without ceremony and
there was greater freedom in limiting them than in limiting legal
estates.
There were two general methods for raising uses, (1) by
transmutation of possession, and (2) without transmutation of
possession." (1) A might convey the legal title to B to the use
of A himself or to the use of C. The legal title was conveyed
by the methods known to the law. The practice of conveying
land to the feoffor's own use became so common that it led to
the doctrine of resulting uses. Equity came to presume that a
conveyance without consideration or without a declaration of
the use, was to the use of the feoffor." (2) A simpler method
of raising uses to others than the grantor was without transmu-
tation of possession. This method took the two forms of bargain
and sale of the use and covenant to stand seised to the use of
another. The bargain and sale was, in effect, the promise
by one for a valuable consideration to stand seised to the use of
another."1 The promise originally might be oral. The consider-
ation was required to make the promise enforceable in equity
against the promisor which was the basis of the use.1 4  The
covenant to stand seised was likewise a promise of A to stand
seised to the use of another, but it had to be made by deed and
the consideration was relationship by blood or marriage. 5 The
10 Feoffments to uses occur much earlier, but the interest of the
cestui que use was not protected by the Court of Chancery until this
time. Ames, The Origin of Uses and Trusts, 21 Har. Law Rev. 265.
11 Co. Lit. 271b; 1 Sanders. Uses 83 et seq.
12 Leake, Property in Land, 83, 254.
'1 Digby, Hist. Real Prop. 330; Williams Real Prop., 21 Ed., 172, 202.
Tiffany, Real Prop. 202.
14 Bacon, Uses 13. The practice of stating at least a nominal con-
sideration in deeds is traceable to this requirement.
15Sharingtop v. Strotton (1565) Plowd. 298; Collard v. Collard,
(1593) Moore 687.
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two forms differed only in these formal requisites. They were
identical in their operation. In both A retained the legal title,
and C had a promise enforceable in equity.
There was no seisin of the use. The feoffee to uses held
the seisin and his seisin satisfied the requirements of the feudal
law. The law looked to him and did not recognize the cestui
que use. The use was consequently free from the restrictive
influences of seisin.'
6
As uses were created without livery and were free from the
restrictions of seisin, they could be limited in ways unknown
to estates at law. Equity followed the law in determining the
descent of the use, and in other respects, but did not follow
the law in restricting the limitations that might be created in
the use.27  Uses could be created in the same form as remain-
ders, but they could also be created to begin in futuro without
a present estate; with intervals between them; and to take effect
in derogation of prior uses. The limitations, in the first two
cases were called springing uses and in the last case a shifting
use, the difference being that the former arose out of the inter-
est of the grantor and the latter cut short the use already lim-
ited to the prior cestui que use. So' limitations of future in-
terests in .the use fell into three classes, remainders, analogous
to remainders at law, and springing and shifting uses which
had no counterparts at law.'8
Upon these interests the statute of uses' 9 came into operation
for various reasons set forth in the preamble, the statute aimed
to end the dualism of equitable and legal interests, not by for-
bidding the creation of uses, but by laying hold of them after
they were created and transforming them into legal interests-.
2 0
To this end the statute provides that -the person who has an
estate in the use, shall have a corresponding seisin or posses-
sion; and -that the estate of the persons seised to uses shall be
in them who have the use "after such quality, manner, form
and conditions as they had before, in or to the use."
One result of the statute was to make the hitherto equit-
able interests of remainders in the use and springing and shift-
ing uses cognizable by the law, and to bring the last two into
16 1 Spence Eq. Jur. 445.
1 Digby, Hist. Real Prop. 327.
I8 Leake, Property in Land 87 et sco.
10 27 Hen. VIII c. 10.
20 Sugden's Gilbert, Uses 73 Note; Goodeve, Real Prop. 258.
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the legal system of future interests with all the freedom from
restraint in their creation that characterized them while they
were equitable interests. The statute in no wise changed the
manner of their creation. On the contrary it made the methods
above outlined for creating uses, available for conveying legal
interests, both present and future. Bargain and sale and cove-
nant to stand seised were added to livery of seisin as modes of
conveying legal estates.2 ' The statute turned the use raised by
the promise into a legal estate, or as'ft was expressed, it "exe-
cuted" the use.
The manner of operation of the statute was such that some
uses were executed at once, some in due course, and others not
at all. If the use were a present one, or one in remainder in
the strict sense, it was changed at once into a legal estate. Thus,
if the use were to B for life, and after to C in fee, B and C had
forthwith by force of the statute legal estates in possession and
remainder. If the use were to arise in the future, there being
no present use created, or a present use were given, to be cut
short later by another, the future tuse was not executed until it
could be enjoyed in possession or in remainder and the seisin
meanwhile remained in the bargainor, or first cestui que use
respectively.2 2  Thus if A bargained and sold the tse to C in
fee to have it after the death of B who took no interest, A re-
mained seised in fee until the death of B and then the statute
executed the use in C; or if A gave the use to B in fee, but if
B die under 21, to C in fee, the statute executed the use in B
at once, and the use to C when the event happened. These con-
tinued to be called springing and shifting uses and they were
the distinctly new classes of interests which the statute made
cognizable by the courts of law.23
21 I.eake, Property in Land 82 et seq.
22 Gray, Perpetuities, secs. 56, 57, 114 note, 201.
23 Of the third class of uses which were not executed at all two were
of great importance. When the person seised to the use had activeduties to perform with respect to the property, as to manage the prop-
erty and to pay the rents and profits to the cestui que use, since the
execution of the use would leave him powerless to perform these duties.
and thus defeat the intention of the person creating the use, the use was
not executed, but continued cognizable only in a court of equity. Thus
originated the doctrine of modern active trusts. Symson v. Turner,(1700) 1 Eq. Cas. ab. 383 note.
And when there was a use upon a use, as a use to B to the use of (or.
on trUst nevertheless for) C, although B had no active duties to per-
form, the second use was not executed by the statute. Tyrrel's Case,(1557) Dyer 155, Benl. 61. 1 And. 37, A. Bendl. 28; Doe d. Lloyd v. Pas-
singham, (1827) 6 B. & C. 305, 9 D. & R. 416, 5 L. J.'K. B. 0. S. 146.
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Future Interests introduced by the Statute of Wills (1540)
-Executory Devises.-Under the feudal system, freehold inter-
ests in land were not devisable at law. The power to devise legal
freehold estates was first given by the statute of wills in 1540. As
devises passed the title without livery of seisin, they could be
made not only of present estates and remainders, but also to
begin in futuro, with intervals between the successive interests
devised, and to shift from one to another. These limitations
were known as executory devises and corresponded to spring-
ing and shifting uses in conveyances inter vivos. They could
be created with the same freedom and had the same incidents.
The term conditional limitation was a common name for a
shifting use and a "shifting" executory devise.
2 4
Thus after 1540 the following future interests could be lim-
ited: remainders created by assurances at the common law, by
way of use, and by devise; springing and shifting uses by con-
veyances operating by way of use, and executory devises by
devise. By a common law conveyance only remainders could be
created, but by a conveyance of bargain and sale or by devise the
future limitation might be either a remainder or one of the 'new
executory interests, and, as future interests were generally limited
by way of use or by devise, there was difficulty in determining
whether the limitation was a remairder or one of the new exec-
utory interests. Before considering how they were distin-
guished, the importance of the distinction should be noted. The
importance lies in the different incidents which attended the
several interests.
The Different Legal Incidents of the Several Future Inter-
ests.--In the early period of the law only vested remainders
This rule has often been attributed to the narrowness of the courts of
law. The true reason was. that before the statute the second use was
repugnant to 'the first and void even in equity. And the statute executed
no other uses than those which had been good in equity before. See
Article by Ames, The Origin of Uses and Trusts, 21 Har. Law Rev. 270.
The use to B was executed by the statute but the use to C was void at
law. About a century later this use upon a use was taken cognizance of
by equity and B was held trustee of the land for C. This is the origin
of the modern passive trust, which led Lord Hardwicke to say that the
statute of uses "had no other effect than to add at most three words to
a conveyance." Hopkins v. Hopkins, (1738) 1 Atk. 581, 591. A bargain
and sale of land to B to the use of C created a passive trust, since the
statute would execute only the use thereby raised to B.
24 Goodeve, Real Prop. 260, 261. "Conditional limitation" is applied
by some writers in another sense. Gray, Restraints on Alienation, sec.
22 note.
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could be created.2 5 Later contingent remainders were allowed.
When the remainderman "own! ' the estate and merely awaits
the termination of the preceding estates to have the right of pos-
session of the land, the remainder is vested. That the remain-
derman may "own" the estate, he must be in esse and ascer-
tained, and his right to possession must not bd subject to any
condition precedent other than the ending of the prior estates.
Vested remainders had in general like incidents with reversions.
The remainder-man had most of the rights, privileges and immuni-
ties of present tenants except those dependent upon actual seisin.
The contingent remainderman does not "own" an estate.
There is but the possibility of an estate to him.28 If the remain-
derman is not in esse, or not ascertained, or if his right to pos-
session is dependent upon the fulfillment of some corildition
precedent other than the ending of the prior estates, the remain-
der is but a possibility and is contingent.
There was the greatest difference between the incidents 'of
contingent remainders and the other executory interests. The
requirement that seisin should not be in abeyance had peculiar
effect on contingent remainder . That a contingent remainder
might be created, there must also be created by the same con-
veyance a present estate of freehold to support it. A term for
years would not support it because a termor had no seisin. The
livery to the present freehold tenant was effective for himself
and those in remainder, and his seisin answered the' requirements
of the rule while his estate lasted, but the rule further required
that the contingent remainder vest before, or instantly, the
prior estate determined; otherwise the next vested estate in re-
mainder or reversion became the estate in possession and the
contingent remainder could never take effect. 7  Thus if A con-
veyed to B for life, and then to the first of his children to
attain 21, in fee, and B died leaving a child not of age that
child could never take.
The present estate might, moreover be terminated prematurely
in several ways and with like effect upon the contingent remain-
der. An alienation by the present tenant by livery of seisin,
fine or recovery, purporting to convey a greater estate than he
25 Williams, Real Prop., 21 ed., 356; cf. Maitland, 6 Law Quar. Rev.
23; 2 Pol. & Maitland, Hist. of Eng. Law 23; Fletcher, Contingent and
Executory Interests in Land 20 et seq.
262 Prest. Abst. Title 107- Challis, Real Prop. 42, 58.
27 Fearne, Cont. Rems. 207 et seq.
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had, operated as a forfeiture of his present estate.
28  So of
attainder of treason or felony. The present estate might also
be destroyed by merger. If A conveyed to B for life, remain-
der to B's first born son for life, remainder to C in fee, and B
before a son was born, surrendered his estate to C, or C released
his estate to B the two estates merged, and B's life estate was
drowned in the fee. Where contingent remainders were limited
in fee, the inheritance, pending the happening of the contin-
gency, was in the grantor, or in the residuary devisee or heirs
of the devisor. So if in the example given in the last paragraiph
B surrendered his estate to A, or if A released the reversion
(which he had pending the happening of the contingency) to
B, B's life estate was drowned in the reversion. 29 In these sev-
eral ways it was in the power of the present tenant to destroy
the estate which supported the contingent remainder before it
vested, and the remainder could not take effect although the
contingency upon which it was to vest happened before B's
death.
After the statutes of uses and wills, all contingent remainders,
whether created by a common law. conveyance, or by way of
use or devise, were liable to be defeated in these ways.
Springing and shifting uses and executory devises, on the
other hand, were not dependent upon the seisin of prior estates
to support them. They were limited to take effect, not in im-
mediate succession to prior estates limited at the same time, but
in defeasance of the estate in the grantor or of another granted
estate. Consequently they took effect whenever the time -ar-
rived, or the contingency happened upon which they were to
vest. And future uses and executory devises were held, in the
celebrated case of Pells v. Brown, 30 indestructible by any acts
of the tenant of the present estate. To illustrate, on devise to
B for life, remainder to the first of his children to attain 21 in
fee, the child could not take unless it attained 21 in B's life
time, and B might, in any one of the several ways indicated
above, while the child was a minor, destroy the possibility of
its taking, even if it attained 21 while he lived; whereas if the
devise were to the first born child of B to attain 21, in fee
28 Archer's Case (1599) 1 Coke 66b; Waddell v. Rattew, (1835) 5 Rawle
(Pa.) 231; McElwee v. Wheeler, (1877) 10 S. C. 392.
293 MINNESOTA LAW REVIEw 135.
30 (1620) Cro. Jac. 590; Stoller v. Doyle, (1913) 257 Ill. 369, 100 N. E.
959; Gray, Perpetuities, sec. 142.
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(there being no preceding life estate) the child could take when-
ever it attained 21, the fee descending to the devisor's heirs in
the meantime, and no act of the heirs could destroy the child's
possibility. The intention of the testator is obviously the same
in both cases, but in the former it is defeated by the rules of
seisin peculiar to remainders.
How Future Limitations were classified.-In determining
whether a future limitation created by way of use or devise
was a remainder or one of the new executory interests, the law
was not impartial. The courts of law were accustomed to re-
mainders, and disliked the new interests. The former, if con-
tingent, were destructible, but the latter were indestructible and,
therefore, tended towards perpetuities. The courts adopted the
rule that any limitation, no matter how created, capable of tak-
ing effect as a remainder must be so classified. Only those that
could not take effect as remainders were executory uses or de-
vises. A limitation was capable of being classified as a remain-
der when it had the qualities necessary to a remainder at the
English common law. Therefore if it had a freehold estate to
support it, was to come into possession in immediate succession
to, and not in derogation of, the prior estate, it was a remainder;
if it lacked any of these qualities it was not a remainder. It was
no longer void but belonged to the new categories Drovided also
that it was created by way of use or devise.3 '
The greatest difficulty lay in distinguishing between con-
tingent remainders and the other contingent executory interests.
The courts looked at the limitations as from the time when they
were made (the delivery of the deed or the death of the devisor).
If the contingent limitation, looked at from that point of time,
could by any possibility take effect as a remainder, it was classi-
fied as a contingent remainder.3 2  For example, if the devise
were to B for life, and after to the first of his children to attain
21 in fee, since a child might be born and attain 21 in B's life
the limitation was a remainder, destructible, and would fail, at
all events, if B died before the child attained 21; whereas if the
devise were to the first child of B to attain 21 in fee, it could
not, since there is no estate limited to support it, by any possi-
bility take effect as a remainder. It would be classified as an
executory devise, would be indestructible, and would vest when-
31 Williams, Real Prop., 21 ed., 356.
3 Gray, Perpetuities, sec. 921.
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ever the condition was satisfied. And there would be a like
classification, as in the last example, with like results, where the
future limitation was not in immediate succession to a prior
estate or was to take effect in derogation of it.
Such in general outline was the American common law.
Livery of seisin was recognized in many of the early cases as
a mode of transferring title.33  The English statute of uses is
generally regarded as a part of the American common law, or
is reenacted in substance. The several classes of future interests
which had arisen under the English common law and statutes
were recognized. '4a The same rules governed the classification
of limitations and there was the same preference for remainders.
Springing and shifting uses and executory devises were inde-
structible and took effect according to the intention of the grantor.
Contingent remainders were destructible and failed with the
supporting estate, the intention of the grantor being defeated
by the rules of seisin.3 5 Statutes have tempered the effect- of
this rule in all jurisdictions, but in many states contingent remain-
ders still lack the complete immunity of the future use and de-
vise. 8
Changes effected by the Minnesdta Statutes.Y-The "future
estate" and "remainder." 3s -Estates in expectancy are divided
33Dehon v. Redfern, (1838) Dud. Eq. (S.C.) 115; Perry v. Price,
(1825) 1 Mo.-553; Knox v. Jenks, (1811) 7 Mass. 488; Matthews v.
Ward, (1839) 10 Gill & J. (Md.) 443.
34 Stimson, Am. Stat. Law, secs. 1701-1703.
84a See diagram, page 317.
35 Craig v. Warner, (1887) 5 Mack. (D.C.) 460, 60 Am. Rep. 381;
Benson v. Tanner, (1917) 276 Ill. 594, 115 N. E. 191 ; Archer v. Jacobs,
(1904) 125 Ia. 467, 101 N. W. 195; Irvine v. Newlin, (1885) 63 Miss.
192; Waddell v. Rattew, (1835) 5 Rawle (Pa.) 231; McElwee v. Wheeler,(1877) 10 Rich. (S.C.) 392.
36 Washburn, Real Prop., 6 ed., sec. 1600.
3 Conveyancing in Minnesota. Livery of seisin is not expressly abol-
ished in Minnesota. A conveyance by livery might still be effective be-
tween the par-ties; see Morton v. Leland, (1880) 27 Minn. 35, 6 N. W.
378; Johnson v. Sandhoff, (1883) 30 Minn. 197, 14 N. W. 889; Conlan v.
Grace, (1886) 36 Minn. 276, 30 N. W. 880, provided that it complied with
the statute of frauds, G. S. 1913, sec. 7002. The statutes prior to the re-
vision of 1895, provided that a conveyance might be made by deed,
acknowledged and recorded, "without any other act or ceremony." G. S.
1866 c. 40, sec. 1; G. S. 1878 c. 40, sec. 1; G. S. 1894 sec. 4160. In Smith
v. Dennett, (1870) 15 Minn. 81, the court referring to this statute said
that "the execution, delivery and recording of a deed operate to pass
the grantor's seisin without any other act or ceremony whateyer; so
that if the grantor has seisin the grantee becomes seized without an
actual entry." This provision was repealed by the revision of 1905. R. L.
1905 sec. 5518. The statutes now state the requisites of a deed to entitle
it to record G. S. 1913, secs. 6833, 6835, but the nature of the conveyance
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into future estates and reversions. Reversions are defined as
they were at common law and continue to be governed by corn-
and what would suffice to pass title between the parties-are not specified.
That deeds generally operate under the statute of uses is, however, im-
pliedly recognized by the statutes which provide that a "deed of quit-
claim and release shall be sufficient to pass all the estate which the
grantor could convey by a deed of bargain and sale." G. S. 1913, sec.
6827.
The chapter of the statutes on uses and trusts provides that:
"6701. Uses and trusts except as authorized and modified. in this
chapter, are abolished; and every estate and interest in lands shall be
deemed a legal right, cognizable as such in the courts of law, except when
otherwise provided by statute."
"6702. Every estate which is now held as a use executed under laws
as they formerly existed is confirmed as a legal estate."
"6703. Every person who, by virtue of any grant, assignment or devise,
is entitled to the actual possession of lands, and the receipt of the rents
arl profits thereof, in law or equity, shall be deemed to have a legal
estate therein of the same quality and duration and subject to the same
s 4s his beneficial interests. But this shall not divest the estate
of any trustee in any existing trust where the title of such trustee is not
merely nominal but is connected with some power of actual disposition or
,. I reirticn to the lands which are the subject of the trust."
"6704. Every disposition of lands whether by deed or devise, except
where otherwise provided in this chapter, shall be made directly to the
perr'n in who;" ti e right to the possession and profits are intended to be
vested, and not to any other to the 'use of, or in trust for, such person,
and, if made to one or more persons in trust for or to the use of another,
no estate or interest, legal or equitable, shall vest in the trustee."
The effect of these provisions is to reenact the most important feature
of the English statute of uses and to extend it. All passive uses and
trusts, without rgard to their number or the manner of their creation
are executed and the interest of the beneficiary becomes a legal title.
Farmers Nat. Bank v. Moran, (1883) 30 Minn. 165, 14 N. W. 805;
Thompson v. Conant, (1893) 52 Minn. 208, 53 N. W. 1145. (Cf. Whiting
v. Whiting, (1890) 42 Minn. 54 , 44 N. W. 1030). The English statute
of uses was doubtless intended to put an end to passive uses and trusts,
but they were revived under the form of a use upon a use. See note 23,
ante. The Minnesota statute fully accomplishes the reformation whikh
the English Parliament aimed at.
38 The sections of the statutes material to this discussion are:
6658. Estates, as respects the time of their enjoyment, are divided
into estates in possession and estates in expectancy. An estate in p sses-
sion is where the owner has an immediate right to the possession of the
land; an estate in expectancy is where the right to possession is post-
poned to a future period.
6659. Estates in expectancy are divided into, (1) estates commencing
at a future day, denominated future estates, and (2) reversions.
6660. A future estate is an estate limited to commence in possession
at a future day, either without the intervention of a precedent estate, or on
the determination, by lapse of time or otherwise, of a precedent estate cre-
ated at the same time.
6661. When a future. estate is dependent upon a precedent estate, it
may be termed a remainder, and may be created and transferred by that
name.
6662. A reversion is the residue of an estate left in the grantor, or his
heirs, or in the heirs of a testator, commencing in possession on the detef-
mination of a particular estate granted or devised.
6663. Future estates are either vested or contingent. They are vested
when there is a person in being who would have an immediate right to
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mon law rules.30 "Future estate" is defined to exclude rever-
sions, and to include contingent future interests limited to third
parties which were not estates, but mere possibilities at common
law. The statutory title "future estate" includes all the limita-
tions which at common law were denominated remainders, vested
or contingent, springing and shifting uses and executory de-
vises. Every limitation which might have been made under the
common law may be created under sections 6660, 6674 and 6677.
Irrespective of their nature, 
-the mode of conveyance by which
they are created, and of their relation to the estate of the grantor,
or to other granted estates, they are classified under the statu-
tory term "future estate."
In Sabledowsky v. Arbuckle,40 A, reserving to himself a life
estate, bargained and sold land to his son B. It was urged that
a freehold estate to commence in the future cannot be created
without a precedent particular estate to support it. The court
held that although it would have been void at common law, the
statutes recognized and impliedly authorized such a conveyance.
The limitation would have been good by the American common
law as a springing use.
the possession of the lands upon the ceasing of the intermediate or pre-ceding estate. They are contingent while the person to whom, or theevent upon which, they are limited to take effect remains uncertain.6674. Subject to the rules established in sections 6652-6673 [the sec-tions omitted deal with restrictions on the creation of future estates
which are not material to this discussion], a freehold estate, ... maybe created to commence at a future day....6677. A remainder may be limited on a contingency which, in case itshould happen, will operate to abridge or determine the precedent estate;and every such remainder shall be construed as a conditidnal limitation,
and shall have the same effect as such limitations would have by law.6682. No expectant estate can be defeated or barred by any alienationor other act of the owner of the intermediate, or precedent estate, norby any destruction of such precedent estate, by disseizin, forfeiture, sur-
render. merger or otherwise.6683. Section 6682 shall not be construed to prevent an expectantestate from being defeated in any manner, or by any act or means, whichthe party creating such estate has, in the creation thereof, provided orauthorized; nor shall an expectant estate thus liable to be defeated be onthat ground adjudged void in its creation.6684. No remainder, valid in its creation, shall be defeated by thedetermination of the precedent estate before the 'happening of the con-tingency on which the remainder is limited to take effect; but, shouldsuch contingency afterward happen, the remainder shall take effect in thesame manner and to the same extent as if the precedent estate had con-
tinued to the same period.6685. Expectant estates are descendible, devisable, and alienable inthe same manner as estates in possession.6692. All expectant estates, except such as are enumerated and definedin this chapter are abolished.
39 3 MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW 339.40 (1892) 50 Minn. 475, 52 N. W. 920.
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In Thomas v. Williams,41 a deed of land was made by A to B
"to have and to hold to B and his heirs in case he survives A."
This was held to be a good conveyance of a "present contingent
right in the land in the nature of a contingent fee." This would
be good as a contingent springing use by the common law.
In Whiting v. Vhiting,42 A devised (in legal effect) to B
in fee, "but if he die within ten years it shall go to his issue."
The court said:
"At common law a fee could not be limited on a fee. The
object of chapter 45 of our statutes was to abolish the technical
distinctions between contingent remainders, springing and sec-
ondary uses, and executory devises, and to bring all these various
executory interests nearer together, and to resolve them into a
few plain principles, and to render all expectant estates equally
secure from being defeated by the subtle refinements of the com-
mon law, contrary to the intention of the grantor or devisor.
And . . we do not see why a remainder may not now be
limited after a fee. But whatever may be the rule, as to 're-
mainders' properly so called, created by a conveyance, even at
common law, in a will a fee could be limited on a fee by way of
executory devise." 43
By abolishing expectant estates as they were at common
law 44 and substituting the statutory future estate, the statutes
neither prevent any limitation possible at the American common
law nor allow any limitation that was impossible by some mode
41 (1908) 105 Minn. 88. 1717 N. W. 155. See also Vesey v. Dwyer,
(1911) 116 Minn. 245, 133 N. W. 612; Hagen v. Hagen, (1917) 136 Minn.
121, 161 N. W. 380.
42 (1890) 42 Minn. 548, 44 N. W. 1030.
43 The court said that apart from the statutes it "would have been
void as a feoffment or a bargain and sale." The court added:
"The courts, however, succeeded in inventing a contrivance by which
to uphold such conveyances by implying a covenant on the part of the
grantor to stand seized of the lands to his own use during his life, and
after his decease to the use of the grantee. Of course, they could not be
upheld in this state on any such ground, for under our statutes, there are
no implied covenants, and such uses are abolished."
But the limitation would -have been good as a bargain and sale at com-
mon law. The court was probably misled by the error of the Massachu-
setts cases cited in argument which is examined and explained in Rogers
v. Eagle Fire Co., (1832) 9 Wend. (N. Y. 611, and see Gray, Perpetui-
ties, secs. 52-57.
As to the second dictum quoted, it is a well recognized doctrine of the
commron law that if a conveyance cannot take effect in the form intended,.
it will be moulded over into some other form for which the requisites are
present. Gray Perpetuities, sec. 65. Is not the statute against implying
covenants in deeds, but declaratory of the common law which did not
prevent the application of this rule, and are not the Minnesota statutes
on uses apt to execute such a use in the covenantee? See sec. 6704 and
note 37. ante, and Thompson v. Conant, (1893) 52 Minn. 208, 53 N. W.
1145. Cf. Eysaman v. Eysaman, (1881) 24 Hun. (N.Y.) 430.
41 Sec. 6692.
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or other. But they make all limitations valid without regard
to the mode of their creation. And they give to all future limi-
tatibns the immunity from destraiction 5 and the capacity of
taking effect according to -the intention of their creator that
characterized certain classes of limitations at common law. It
is, consequently,. no longer material to which class or denomi-
nation, as they were at common law, any particular limitation
is to be referred, since all future limitations have the same
incidents. 48  The statutory future estate includes within itself
all the common law classes of limitations and has itself the
incidents of those classes brought in by the statutes of uses and
wills.4 7  Thus the common law rules applicable to springing and
shifting uses and to executory devises 48 are applicable to the stat-
utory future estate, except so far as other rules are provided by
the statutes themselves. The statutes eliminated the class of con-
tingent remainders with their peculiar incidents arising from
the feudal rules of seisin. But the limitations that had hitherto
been classified as such are now classified simply as "future
estates."
Some future estates are further denominated "remainders."
They are remainders when they are dependent upon precedent
estates.49  The term includes limitations denominated remain-
ders at common law, and also limitations which operate to
45 Secs. 6682, 6684.
46 The New York Revisers who prepared the original draft of these
statutes said in their appended notes:
"The object of this section [6682] is to extend to every species of
future limitation, the rule that is now well established, in relation to an
executory devise, namely, that it cannot be barred or prevented from
taking effect by any mode whatever. . . . The whole doctrine of the law
in respect to the means by which contingent remainders may be destroyed,
is strictly feudal. . . . The protection of the interests of the persons
entitled in remainder, will be effectually answered by placing all contin-
gent remainders on the same footing as executory devises, and the end
is thus attained in the most simple and direct manner, without the neces-
sity of present expense, or the hazard of future litigation.
"Another most important advantage . . . will result from reducing
all expectant estates substantially to the same class. We shall prevent
all future litigation on the purely technical question, to which class or
denomination any particular limitation is to be referred. It is a well
known rule, that no expectant estate, even if created by will, or a convey-
ance to uses, is to be construed as an executory devise, or secondary use.
if it be so limited, as to be capable of taking effect as a remainder and
some of the most difficult and obstruse cases to be found in the reports,
have turned exclusively on the application of this rule."
47 Fowler, Real Prop. Law 51, 218.
48 See G. S. sec. 6677.
49 G. S. sec 6661.
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abridge or determine the precedent estate"o which were not re-
mainders at common law. The latter are also called conditional
limitations,-their common law designation. The statutory re-
mainder thus includes all the estates which take effect in posses-
sion subsequently to some other estate, created at the same time,
either in immediate succession to it, or in derogation of it. Does
it include springing uses and devises that are limited to commence
in futuro without the limitation of any present estate? Chan-
cellor Kent was of the opinion that it does.5' If so it would be
synonymous with "future estate." A learned modern writer
questions this conclusion and is of the opinion that these are
"future estates" but not "remainders." 52  The distinction is
perhaps of no importance except to determine what can be
passed as a "remainder" under section 6661. The term is used
in several other sections of the statutes, 53 but limitations dealt
with by these sections are such as would fall under the more
restricted definition. The term is, however, unnecessary, and
its use in a restricted sense unfortunate, and tends only to renew
the confusion which it is the aim of- the statutes to remove. The
term "future estate" might replace "remainder" throughout the
statutes without altering their meaning.
Vested and Contingent Limitations-At Common Law and
under the Statutes.-By the common law reversions and remain-
ders are the only vested interests.5 4 Future interests are non-con-
tingent and contingent. Interests non-contingent include vested
interests and certain executory interests which are neither vested
nor contingent. A springing use or an executory devise to an ascer-
tained person to commence on a future event certain to happen,
as to C in fee after the death of B is not vested; whereas if the
limitation to C were after a life estate to B, it is a remainder
and vested. The explanation lies in the fact that reversions and
vested remainders are the only true future estates at common
law.5  The reversioner or vested remainderman has a portion
50 G. S. sec 6677.
514 Comm. 272.
52 Fowler, Real Prop. Law 222.
5 G. S. secs. 6666, 6668, 6669, 6670, 6671; see also secs. 6672, 6678,
6679, 6684.
54Gray, Perpetufties, secs. 113-114, 201.
55 Goodeve, Real Prop. 211; Hawkins, Wills 221. The term "vested"
is often used in the secondary sense of "transmissible." In that sense
many contingent and executory limitations are vested. "As far as I can
discover, the only case in which a contingent future interest is not trans-
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of the fee of which conveyance has been made. But when the
future limitation is of a use or devise, which cannot take effect
by way of remainder, the conception is that the whole fee re-
mains in the grantor, or in the devisor's heirs, until the time
comes for the future limitation to become an estate in possession
or in remainder." The future use or devise, although certain,
remains until that time an executory limitation.
The Minnesota Statutes provide that "future estates are
either vested or contingent.15 7 This provision eliminates the dis-
tinction between vested remainders and other executory interests
which are certain. It makes all future non-contingent limitations
vested, and brings them within the concept of estates which was
restricted to reversions and remainders at common law. In
respect to vesting all future estates under the statutes are of
the nature of remainders at common law.
There are many definitions of vested and contingent remain-
ders. Blackstone defines them thus :58
"Vested remainders (or remainders executed whereby a pres-
ent interest passes to the party, though to be enjoyed in futuro)
are where the estate is invariably fixed to remain to a determinate
person, after the particular estate is spent. Contingent or
executory remainders (whereby no present interest passes) are
where the estate in remainder is limited to take effect, either to a
dubious or uncertain person, or upon a dubious or uncertain
event; so that the particular estate may chance to be determined,
and the remainder never take effect."
Gray says 9 that the line between vested and contingent re-
mainders is drawn as follows:
"A remainder is vested in A, when, throughout its continu-
ance, A, or A and his heirs, have the right to the immediate
possession, whenever and however, the preceding estates may
determine. A remainder is- contingent if, in order for it to come
into possession the fulfillment of some condition precedent other
than the determination of the preceding freehold estates is
necessary."
These definitions are sufficient for our present purpose of
contrasting the common law with the definition given by the
statutes.
nissible, is where the being in existence when the contingency happens
is an essential part of the description of the person who is to take." Per
Kay J. in Re Creswell, (1883) L. R. 24 Chancery Div. 102, 107. And see
Gray, Perpetuities, sec. 118.
56 See p. 312 ante.
5 G. S. sec. 6663.
582 Com. 168, 169.
59 Perpetuities sec. 101.
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The statutes60 provide that future estates-
"Are vested when there is a person in being who would have
an immediate right to the possession of the lands upon the ceas-
ing of the intermediate or preceding estate. They are contingent
while the person to whom, or the event upon which, they are
limited to take effect remains uncertain."
This provision, when first enacted in New York, was said
by Chancellor Kent to express accurately and fully, the common
law. 1' But the courts have decided that it makes limitations,
which were contingent at the common law, vested.
The common law itself favors the vesting of estates and has
gone a long way in holding certain limitations vested. A re-
mainder is not prevented from vesting merely because it may
terminate before it becomes the present estate. A life estate
in remainder may terminate before the preceding estate, yet it
may be vested. Again a remainder is none the less vested be-
cause it may be terminated, by the operation of a condition sub-
sequent before it becomes the present estate. Thus, if the limi-
tations are to B for life, remainder to C in fee, but if when C
dies he leaves no children, then to D in fee, C's remainder is
vested, although he may die childless in B's lifetime. And when
a condition attached to a remainder is susceptible of being con-
strued as either precedent and so to be satisfied before the re-
mainder becomes the present estate, or subsequent so that it might
become operative after the remainder has become the present
estate, it will preferably be regarded as subsequent, and the
remainder as vested, although the condition may become oper-
ative to terminate the remainder and so to prevent it ever
becoming the estate in possession.62
But suppose the condition is by its terms to be operative only
in case it is fulfilled before the remainder becomes the present
estate. Of this class of cases Gray says :63
"One class of cases, however, presents some difficulty, that,
namely, in which the contingency, if it happens at all, must hap-
pen at or before the termination of the particular estate, and
the coming into possession of the remainder. Supnose, for
instance, a gift to A for life, remainder to B and his heirs, but
if B dies before the termination of the particular estate, then
to C and his heirs. Here, if the condition ever affects B's estate
at all, it will prevent it from coming ,into possession; it will
60 G. S. 6663.
614 Corn. 202.
62 Gray. Perpetuities sec. 102, 103.
63 Perpetuities secs 104-108.
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW
never divest it after it has once come into possession. Remain-
ders subject to conditions of this sort might have been regarded
in three ways.
"(1) If the law looked on vested and contingent interests with
an impartial eye, it would seem that such remainders should be
held contingent. A condition which may prevent an estate com-
ing into possession, but which can never divest it after it has
come into possession, is a condition in its nature precedent rather
than subsequent. But the preference of the law for vested inter-
ests has prevented this view being adopted.
"(2) Such a condition might be regarded in all cases as a
condition subsequent, the circumstance that the contingency must
happen, if at all, at or before the end of the particular estate
being regarded as immaterial. The effect of this construction
would be to make a remainder vested at any time, if there was,
at that time, a person ready and entitled to take possession as
remainder-man, should the particular estate then determine,
although, should the particular estate determine at some other
time, such person might not be entitled to the remainder. Upon
this theory, if there was a devise to A for life, remainder to
his surviving children, the remainder would be at any particular
moment vested in the children who would survive A should he
at that moment die.
"(3) Neither of these views is that of the common law. Wheth-
er a remainder is vested or contingent depends upon the language
employed. If the conditional element is incorporated into the
description of, or into the gift to the remainder-man, then the
remainder is contingent; but if, after words giving a vested
interest, a clause is added divesting it, the remainder is vested.
Thus on a devise to A for life, remainder to his children, but if
any child dies in the lifetime of A his share to go to those who
survive, the share of each child is vested, subject to be divested
by its death. But on a devise to A for life, remainder to such
of his children as survive him, the remainder is contingent."
The statutory definition adopts the second view stated above.
In Moore v. LittelI4 the conveyance was to B for life, and after
his death to his heirs. The remainder was held to be vested
under the statute, although the heirs could not be ascertained
until the death of B. Woodruff, J., said:
"If there 'is a person in being who would have an immediate
right to the possession of the lands upon the ceasing of the
precedent estate, then that remainder is vested' within the terms
of the statute. It is not 'a person who now has .a present fixed
right of future possession or enjoyment' but a person who would
64 (1869) 41 N. Y. 66. Other decisions and articles are collected in
Gray, Perpetuities sec. 107 notes. Ci. Minnesota Debenture Co. v. Dean,
(1902) 85 Minn. 473. 89 N. W. 848; Armstrong v. Armstrong, (1893)
54 Minn. 248, 55 N. W. 971.
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have an immediate right if the precedent estate were now to
cease. I read this language according to its ordinary and nat-
ural signification, and if you can point to a human being and
say as to him, 'that man, or that woman, by virtue of the grant
of a remainder, would have an immediate right to the possession
of certain lands if the precedent estate of another therein should
now cease,' then the statute says, he or she has a vested re-
mainder."
The statutory definition of vested remainders is unfortunate.
It has caused confusion and uncertainty in the law of New
York.65  The definition of contingent remainders contradicts it.
A remainder is said to be contingent while the person to whom
it is limited remains uncertain. The two contradictory defini-
tions led Chief Justice Savage to say that some remainders are,
by the definitions, both vested and contingent at the same
moment.61
The vesting of remainders is a matter qf law and logic. The
various definitions of vested remainders do not define what they
are but state when they exist. The legal concept of a vested
remainder is "ownership" of an estate which has not yet become
a right to possession of the land.67 The concept requires an
"owner," and is not satisfied by saying that a certain person
would be "owner" if something happened. It would be almost
as good sense to say that an heir apparent has a vested estate
in his ancestor's land because he would succeed to it if the
ancestor died now. The common law in its partiality for vested
remainders* has pushed logic to the limit; but the statutory
definition sends it beyond. There was sound reason for the
common law tendency. Contingent remainders failed unless
they were vested when the precedent estates terminated. But
the statutes make all remainders independent of the precedent
estates. No reason remains for forcing vesting in unusual cases
and any leaning away from the common law ought rather to
be in the other direction.
65'See article "The New York Test of Vested Remainders." 9 Colum-
bia Law Review 587, 687, in which the learned writer ingeniously construes
the definition to accord with the common law, and with the definition
of contingent remainders. If such is the intent of the statute it could be
better expressed. See also article "Uncertainties In The Law of Vested
Remainders," 10 Bench & Bar (N.S.) 197, 248, 439; 11 ibid., p. 287.
66 Carter v. Lorillard, (1835) 14 Wend. (N.Y.) 265.
67 The vested remainderman "is vested with a portion of the owner-
ship of the land." Hawkins, Wills 210. See Gray, Perpetuities, sec. 108,
note 2.
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Alienation of Future Interests.-Vested remainders are de-
scendible, devisable, and alienable at the common law. Some con-
tingent interests are descendible at common law, others are not.
A contingent interest is descendible 8 when the person to whom
it is limited is ascertained and the condition upon which it is
limited may be satisfied after his death. When the person to
whom it is limited is unascertained, or the condition can only
be satisfied by his continued existence the interest is not descen-
dible. Thus upon a limitation to C in fee if B leaves no chil-
dren, the interest of C is descendible; but upon limitations to B's
children who survive him in fee, or to C in fee if he live to
twenty-one, there is no descendible interest in either case until
the limitation vests. Contingent future interests which are descen-
dible are also devisable.69
At common law contingent future interests were not assign-
able'70  Vested remainders and reversions could be conveyed
by deed of grant, but contingent interests were mere possibilities
which were deemed incapable of alienation by a conveyance at
law. They could be released to the tenant in possession.71 They
might, furthermore, be passed by fine by way of estoppel, so as
to bind the interest which should afterwards accrue on the ful-
fillment of the condition.71 And assignments for a valuable con-
sideration were enforced in equity.73
The statutes provide that "expectant estates are descendible,
devisable and alienable in the same manner as estates in posses-
sion."7 4  Contingent "remainders" are "expectant estates" for
68 By the common law rules of descent both vested and contingent
future interests descended to the heirs of the first purchaser of the in-terest, and not to the heirs the person last entitled. Thus if a descendiblefuture interest were limited to B, and B died leaving C his heir, and C
also died before the interest vested in possession, the interest would passnot to the heirs of C but to the heirs of B. The claimant must makehimself heir to the first purchaser. Fearne, Cont. Rems. 561b. Americanstatutes of descent have generally changed the common law rule, anddescent is traced from the person last entitled. See, Galladay v. Knock,(1908) 235 Ill. 412, 85 N. E. 649, 126 A. S. R. 224; Kales, Cases on Prop-
erty 86 note. "Three Suggestions concerning Future Interests" by Prof.Ernst Freund, 33 Har. L. Rev. 526. The Minnesota statutes make such in-terests to descend as do estates in possession. Sec. 6691.69Fletcher, Contingent and Executory Interests in Land 177; Roe v.Griffiths, (1766) 2 W. B1. 606; Goodtitle v. Wood, (1741) 3 Durn. &East 94; Moor v. Hawkins, (1765) 2 Eden 342.70Fulwood's Case, (1591) 4 Co. Rep. 64b; Lampets' Case, (1612) 10Co. Rep. 48a; 1 Tiffany, Real Property 306.71Williams, Real Property, 21 ed. 367; 1 Tiffany, Real Property 306.
72 Fearne, Cont. Rems. 365, 551. Doe d. Christmas v. Oliver, (1829)10 B. & C. 187.73Withered v. Withered, (1828) 2 Simmon 183.
74 G. & 6691.
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the purposes of this section .7  Limitations contingent on some
event but certain as to the person may be transferred, subject to
the condition.
Limitations to persons not in being are inalienable, and those
to persons not ascertained are not absolutely alienable. Even
though there is a person in being who would have an immediate
right to the possession of the lands upon the ceasing of the pre-
cedent estate, and so the interest be vested,71 an alienation by that
person will be effective only when, and in so far as, he proves
to be -the person ultimately entitled. Thus if the limitations are
to A for life, remainder to his heirs, the heirs apparent may alien
during A's life, but the alienee's interest is dependent upon the
alienors proving to be A's heirs at his death.7 7 Future estates to
persons not in being or not ascertained, are, consequently liable
to offend the rule against restraints on alienation, and to be void




75 Fowler, Real Property Law 372.
76 See, p. 326 ante.
77 Kilpatrick v. Barron, (1891) 125 N. Y. 751, 26 N. E. 925; Harris
v. Strodl, (1892) 132 N. Y. 392, 30 N. E. 962; Downey v. Seib, (1906)
185. N. Y. 427, 78 N. E. 66, 8 L. R. A. (N.S.) 49 113 A. S. R. 926;
Cf. Wainwright v. Sawyer, (1889) 150 Mass. 168. 22 N. E. 885; Brown
v. Fulkerson, (1894) 125 Mo. 400, 28 S. W. 632.
